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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Donald Raven pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 
import heroin into the United States from Thailand in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 963.  On appeal, he challenges the sentence 
imposed by the district court.  We will affirm in most respects, 
and remand only for resentencing. 
 I. 
 In early 1993, Raven's grocery business was 
experiencing financial difficulty.  Hoping to save his business, 
Raven tried to contact Tunde Amosa Taju, a friend who had once 
helped Raven find work as a drug courier.  Raven had previously 
transported heroin from Thailand to the United States as a 
courier, and he sought to make some money this time by either 
recruiting couriers for Taju or acting as a courier again 
himself. 
 When Raven tried to telephone Taju at his home, he was 
unaware that Taju had been arrested on drug charges and was in 
jail.  Nor did he know or suspect that Taju was cooperating with 
 
 
the government.  Upon learning of Raven's call, Taju informed the 
Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") that Raven had tried to 
contact him.  The DEA directed Taju to solicit Raven's services 
as a courier and to persuade Raven to find other couriers to 
assist Taju in importing heroin into the United States.  Taju was 
also instructed to set up a meeting between himself, Raven and 
DEA Special Agent Gregory Hilton. 
 Taju did as he was told.  In mid-February, 1993, at a 
hotel in Newark, New Jersey, Taju introduced Hilton to Raven as 
someone seeking drug couriers to import heroin from Bangkok, 
Thailand, into the United States.  During this meeting, Raven 
said that he wanted to help Taju and Hilton and explained his 
previous involvement in drug importation.  He also produced his 
passport and the passport of Denise Ramirez, whom he had 
recruited to act as an additional courier. 
 Approximately two weeks later, Raven and Ramirez met 
with Hilton and Taju at a diner in Elizabeth, New Jersey.  Hilton 
produced an itinerary of the proposed trip to Bangkok from New 
York City and agreed to supply Raven and Ramirez with airplane 
tickets and expense money to use during their trip.  Hilton told 
Raven that he wanted to import a minimum of three to four 
kilograms of heroin, which would be hidden in the lining of two 
or three suitcases.  Hilton further commented that "it would not 
be worth the trip if we didn't bring back at least four 
kilograms" (Appendix ("App.") at 50), and Taju said that two or 
three suitcases would hold up to eight and one-half kilograms of 
 
 
heroin.  Raven responded that he would retrieve whatever amount 
of heroin Hilton wanted. 
 Approximately a week later, Raven and Hilton met again, 
this time in a hotel parking lot in Newark.  At this meeting, 
Hilton told Raven that his Thailand supplier now wanted to export 
as much as eight kilograms of heroin.  Raven continued to express 
his willingness to assist, stating that he could supply 
additional couriers and reiterating that he would bring back into 
the United States whatever quantity of heroin Hilton requested.  
Hilton later testified that Raven specifically agreed to 
transport eight kilograms of heroin from Thailand to the United 
States at this meeting. 
 Shortly thereafter, in a conversation on the telephone, 
Hilton advised Raven that the supplier in Bangkok had again 
increased the amount of heroin they wanted transported.  
According to Hilton, Raven agreed this time to transport what 
would amount to up to twelve kilograms of heroin. 
 The final meeting between Raven, Ramirez and Hilton was 
scheduled to take place at a hotel in Elizabeth, where Raven and 
Ramirez were going to pick up their airplane tickets and advance 
money.  Upon entering the hotel, Raven and Ramirez were arrested.  
In a post-arrest statement, Raven said that he was going to the 
Orient to pick up heroin and that he expected to make 
approximately $60,000 for his efforts.  Raven and Ramirez were 
charged with conspiracy to import eight kilograms of heroin in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963. 
 
 
 Raven pleaded guilty to a superseding information 
charging him with conspiracy to import an unspecified amount of 
heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963.  The plea and superseding 
information came about because although the parties agreed that 
Raven had violated 21 U.S.C. § 963, they disagreed as to the 
weight of the heroin for which he should bear responsibility.  In 
their plea agreement, the parties requested that the court 
determine at sentencing the weight to be used in calculating 
Raven's offense level pursuant to United States Sentencing 
Guidelines ("Guidelines") section 2D1.1. 
 At the sentencing hearing, the district court correctly 
noted that Raven's base offense level would be the same -- 34 -- 
if he was found responsible for any amount between three and ten 
kilograms of heroin.  See Guidelines §§ 2D1.1(a)(3) and (c)(5).  
Next, the district court found that, based on the negotiations 
that had occurred, Raven should be held responsible for "three to 
four" kilograms of heroin for purposes of sentencing.  This 
determination gave Raven a base offense level of 34, which was 
adjusted downward to 31 for acceptance of responsibility.  
Raven's criminal history category placed him in a sentencing 
range that would have been between 108 and 135 months, but the 
court recognized that Congress had provided that defendants 
convicted of a violation involving more than one kilogram of 
heroin face a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years (see 21 
U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(A)), making Raven's adjusted Guideline range 
120 to 135 months.  The court sentenced Raven to 120 months' 
 
 
imprisonment, and this appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
 II. 
 Raven advances three challenges to the district court's 
sentencing decision:  (1) the district court erred in failing to 
properly apply Application Note 12 to Guideline section 2D1.1 in 
determining Raven's offense level; (2) the district court erred 
in refusing to depart downward on the ground that Raven was the 
victim of "sentencing entrapment"; and (3) the district court 
erred in finding that Raven was predisposed to import three to 
four kilograms of heroin.  Only his first claim requires extended 
discussion. 
 A. 
 Raven's primary contention on appeal concerns the 
district court's quantification of the amount of drugs to be 
attributed to him for sentencing purposes in what was obviously 
an uncompleted narcotics trafficking arrangement.  Under the 
Guidelines, the offense level used to determine a sentence for a 
drug offense is based initially upon the weight of the controlled 
substance for which the defendant is held accountable.  See 
generally Guidelines §§ 2D1.1 et seq.  Application Note 12 to 
section 2D1.1 provides, in pertinent part: 
 In an offense involving negotiation to 
traffic in a controlled substance, the weight 
under negotiation in an uncompleted 
distribution is used to calculate that 
amount.  However, where the court finds that 
the defendant did not intend to produce and 
was not reasonably capable of producing the 
negotiated amount, the court shall exclude 
from the guideline calculation the amount 
 
 
that it finds the defendant did not intend to 
produce and was not reasonably capable of 
producing. 
Guidelines § 2D1.1, Application Note 12 ("Note 12") (emphasis 
added).  It is the meaning of this Note -- and especially its 
final sentence, italicized above -- that forms the core of 
Raven's dispute with the government and the district court.  
Raven contends that the district court erred in applying Note 12, 
and that this error resulted in an incorrect base level for his 
offense.  We have jurisdiction to review this claim because Raven 
"allege[s] the district court committed legal (i.e., procedural) 
errors when imposing [his] sentence."  United States v. 
Georgiadis, 933 F.2d 1219, 1222 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 1. 
 The parties agree that in cases involving uncompleted 
drug distributions, the government generally bears the burden of 
proving the weight of drugs under negotiation, just as it bears 
the burden of proving the weight of drugs at issue in any drug 
sentencing proceeding.  See United States v. McCutchen, 992 F.2d 
22, 25 (3d Cir. 1993).  The parties disagree, however, about 
which party bears the burden of proving the applicability of the 
final sentence of Note 12, which addresses whether a defendant 
intended to produce and was reasonably capable of producing the 
negotiated amount of drugs.  Resolving this issue requires two 
distinct inquiries.  First, what is the nature of the burden -- 
does the party with the burden have to demonstrate both intent 
and capability (or their lack), or is it sufficient to 
 
 
demonstrate either intent or capability (or, again, their lack)?  
Second, who has the burden -- the government or the defendant? 
 Although we have not directly addressed these 
questions,1 they have generated a surprising variety of responses 
among our sister circuits.2  Not only have the courts of appeals 
                     
1.   In United States v. Reyes, 930 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1991), a 
defendant contended that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the district court's findings that his conspiracy 
involved more than five kilograms of cocaine and that he was a 
leader or organizer.  We stated that "[w]ith respect to these 
sentencing adjustments, the government bore the burden of 
persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence."  Id. at 315.  At 
least one court has interpreted this statement as having 
addressed and resolved the issue of who bears the burden of 
proving intent and capability in an unconsummated drug 
transaction.  United States v. Smiley, 997 F.2d 475, 481 n.7 (8th 
Cir. 1993).  Reyes, however, did not address that issue. 
 
 In United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1992), 
we ruled that the defendants in a drug conspiracy could not be 
held responsible for the full weight of an alleged "mixture" of 
boric acid and cocaine because the cocaine and boric acid simply 
were not a "mixture" as described in Guideline section 2D1.1(c) 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Chapman v. United States, 
500 U.S. 453 (1991).  Noting that the Guidelines allow sentencing 
courts to "look beyond the amount of drugs actually seized and 
consider the negotiations" in making a determination of base 
level (id. at 1088, citing former Guideline section 2D1.1 n.1, 
the predecessor to Note 12 (see infra n.2)), we observed that 
"the government produced no evidence of availability to the 
defendants of three kilograms of cocaine and that the district 
court made no finding that a higher guideline range was justified 
by any ability of defendants to deliver in fact three kilograms 
of cocaine . . . ."  Id. at 1008.  However, we did not purport to 
decide who bore the burden of persuasion regarding the last 
sentence of Note 12 or to elucidate the nature of that burden.  
In any event, the result in Rodriguez is wholly consistent with 
the result we reach today, since in Rodriguez the defendants' 
lack of intent to actually sell three kilograms of cocaine was 
uncontested (id. at 1006), and we concluded that the government 
had not demonstrated that the defendants had the capability to 
produce three kilograms, either (id. at 1008). 
2.   Most of the decisions interpreting the language at issue in 
this case were actually discussing the predecessor to Note 12 -- 
 
 
split,3 but some have been unable to establish a consistent 
application of Note 12 even among panels.4  And a panel of the 
(..continued) 
Note 1 to then-Guideline section 2D1.4.  See United States v. 
Hendrickson, 26 F.3d 321, 330 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1150 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1262-63 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United 
States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1183 (7th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Barnes, 993 F.2d 680, 683 (9th Cir. 1993).  But see 
United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(addressing Note 12); United States v. Legarda, 17 F.3d 496, 499 
(1st Cir. 1994) (same), United States v. Tillman, 8 F.3d 17, 19 
(11th Cir. 1993) (same).  As the Second Circuit noted in 
Hendrickson, the Sentencing Commission deleted Guideline 
section 2D1.4 and transferred the relevant language of Note 1 of 
that section to Note 12 of section 2D1.1, effective November 1, 
1992.  Hendrickson, 26 F.3d at 330 n.6 (citing Amendment 447 to 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Guideline Manual, 
Appendix C, 269-71).  Because the text of Note 1 to former 
Guideline section 2D1.4 and the pertinent portion of Note 12 to 
current section 2D1.1 are identical, in the text we discuss these 
courts' holdings as if they had interpreted the relevant portion 
of Note 12. 
3.   The Ninth Circuit has found that Note 12 allocates the 
burden of persuasion to the defendant to prove that he or she 
lacked both intent and capacity to produce the drugs under 
negotiation.  United States v. Barnes, 993 F.2d 680, 683 (9th 
Cir. 1993).  The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, has found that the 
burden is on the government to prove both a defendant's intent 
and his or her capacity.  United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 
1183-84 (7th Cir. 1991).  The Eleventh Circuit has found that the 
government bears the burden of persuasion, but that it satisfies 
that burden by showing either intent to produce or reasonable 
capability of producing the negotiated amount of drugs.  United 
States v. Tillman, 8 F.3d 17, 19 (11th Cir. 1993); cf. United 
States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1150-51 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(government did not contest it had burden of persuasion, and 
Fourth Circuit found that the negotiated amount should be used 
unless defendant lacked both intent and ability to complete 
transaction). 
4.   In United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 
1991), the Sixth Circuit found that once the government 
establishes the negotiated amount of drugs, it is the defendant's 
burden to prove that he was not "capable of producing that 
amount."  Id. at 368.  The Christian court did not address 
 
 
Second Circuit has recently taken the extraordinary step of 
rejecting the note's language, finding that it "obscured" the 
government's obligation in every drug conspiracy case involving 
unconsummated transactions to prove a defendant's intent to 
produce the negotiated amount.5 
(..continued) 
whether the defendant must prove both lack of intent and lack of 
capability, but because intent was not contested by the 
defendant, the necessary inference of the Christian court's 
holding is that the defendant would have been entitled to 
sentencing according to a lesser amount of drugs if he had proven 
a lack of ability to produce the negotiated amount.  However, 
Christian's vitality is put in question by the Sixth Circuit's 
subsequent ruling in United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (en banc).  Without explicitly overruling Christian, 
the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, nevertheless reached 
conclusions directly contrary to those of the Christian panel.  
According to Gessa, the government has the burden of proof, see 
Gessa, 971 F.2d at 1266 n.7 (majority) & 1280 (Krupansky, J., 
dissenting), but the government's burden would be met by showing 
either a defendant's intent or his or her reasonable capability 
to produce the negotiated amount of drugs (id. at 1265).  Other 
courts have also issued conflicting opinions.  In United States 
v. Legarda, 17 F.3d 496 (1st Cir. 1994), the First Circuit ruled 
that the government bears the burden of proving both intent and 
capability to produce the negotiated amount of drugs.  Id. at 
499-500.  However, in United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 
1994), another panel, without referring to Legarda, subsequently 
ruled that Note 12 is conjunctive -- that is, the district court 
should base its sentence on the negotiated amount unless it found 
that the defendant lacked both the intent and capability to 
produce that amount.  Pion, 25 F.3d at 25.  Finally, a recent 
panel of the Second Circuit frankly acknowledged that prior 
panels of that court had reached differing results on the issue 
of whether the last sentence of Note 12 should be read as 
conjunctive or disjunctive.  United States v. Hendrickson, 26 
F.3d 321, 335-36 (2d Cir. 1994). 
5.   In Hendrickson, the Second Circuit rejected the plain 
language of the application note because it had "enmeshed the 
base offense determination in quandaries of form to the exclusion 
of substance."  Hendrickson, 26 F.3d at 336.  Instead, the court 
ruled that the government bears the burden of proving the 
defendant's "intent to produce the contested quantities of 
narcotics" in every case, but that "failure to produce" -- that 
 
 
 We turn first to the question of what must be proven 
before a court may discount the negotiated amount in an 
unconsummated drug transaction and instead impose a sentence 
based on some lesser amount.  This issue is straightforward:  as 
Note 12 clearly states, the sentencing court must find "that the 
defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably 
capable of producing the negotiated amount," and again the amount 
to be excluded is limited to the amount "the defendant did not 
intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing."  
Note 12 (emphasis added).  In other words, the final sentence of 
Note 12 is conjunctive, not disjunctive:  for a defendant to be 
sentenced on a lesser amount, the sentencing court must find both 
lack of intent and lack of reasonable capability.6  Accord, e.g., 
United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1151 (4th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Barnes, 993 F.2d 680, 682 (9th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Tillman, 8 F.3d 17, 19 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 The more difficult question, however, is who bears the 
burden of persuasion on the issues of intent and capability.  To 
(..continued) 
is, lack of ability -- "is relevant only to the extent it 
suggests an absence of intent or agreement."  Id. at 337. 
6.   The issue dividing the Hendrickson panel (see supra n.5) is 
not present and need not be decided here.  We note, however, that 
insofar as Note 12 states that the sentencing court must find 
"that the defendant did not intend to produce and was not 
reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount) (to reduce 
drug quantity) the majority opinion in Hendrickson contains a 
useful insight:  although a conspiracy is defined by the parties' 
agreement, so that the critical factor is the intent to produce 
(or carry) the drugs, lack of ability might well bear upon the 
existence of intent and on the scope of the agreement. 
 
 
resolve this issue, we start with the uncontroversial principle 
that the government bears the burden of establishing the amount 
of drugs for which a defendant shall be held responsible in an 
unconsummated drug transaction.  McCutchen, 992 F.2d 22, 25 (3d 
Cir. 1993); accord, e.g., United States v. Hendrickson, 26 F.3d 
321, 332 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 
1184 (7th Cir. 1991).  Thus, even in a case implicating the final 
sentence of Note 12, the government must first prove the amount 
of drugs that was the object of the conspiracy -- that is, the 
amount that was negotiated.  The government can meet this burden 
by referring to the presentence investigation report, which, if 
"unchallenged by the defendant is, of course, a proper basis for 
sentence determination."  United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 
285, 290 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989).  Alternatively, the government may 
present evidence at the sentencing hearing establishing the 
amount of drugs that the parties had settled upon (which, in 
fact, it did in this case). 
 Once the government makes its prima facie showing that 
a particular amount of drugs was negotiated, the defendant who 
wishes to be found responsible for a lesser amount of drugs must 
come forward with evidence supporting the proposition that he or 
she lacked both the intent and the reasonable capability to 
produce the drugs in question.  As we explained in McDowell, "the 
party challenging" the government's prima facie case at a 
sentencing hearing "has the burden of production, under 
Rule 32(c), to come forward with evidence that tends to indicate" 
that the evidence relied upon by the government "is incorrect or 
 
 
incomplete."  McDowell, 888 F.2d at 290 n.1.7  In order to meet 
this burden of production, the defendant may cast a different 
light on the government's evidence, elicit evidence of his or her 
own during cross examination of any witnesses offered by the 
government, or present other evidence suggesting lack of intent 
and lack of reasonable capability. 
 The ultimate burden of persuasion, however, does not 
shift to the defendant in a case implicating the final sentence 
of Note 12.  To the contrary, as explained above, that burden 
remains at all times with the government.  Thus, if a defendant 
puts at issue his or her intent and reasonable capability to 
produce the negotiated amount of drugs by introducing new 
evidence or casting the government's evidence in a different 
light, the government then must prove either that the defendant 
intended to produce the negotiated amount of drugs or that he or 
she was reasonably capable of doing so.8 
                     
7.   Although McDowell was specifically addressing a defendant's 
challenge to a presentence investigation report, the discussion 
of a defendant's burden of production applies with equal force in 
the current context. 
8.   We do not imply that the government must necessarily 
introduce further evidence to meet this ultimate burden.  For 
example, it is not hard to envision situations in which a court 
could easily conclude that the defendant's theory is mistaken or 
that his or her evidence does not undermine the government's 
evidence of the amount of drugs involved in the unconsummated 
transaction.  We merely emphasize that the ultimate burden of 
persuading a court that the defendant intended to produce or was 
capable of producing the amount the government claims was 
negotiated rests with the government. 
 
 
 Distributing the burdens of production and persuasion 
in this manner most closely adheres to the language, logic and 
intent of Note 12.  We recognize that the last sentence of Note 
12 could be read as an exception to the general rule that courts 
should use the weight of drugs under negotiation to determine a 
defendant's base offense level.  Under that reading, the first 
part of Note 12 would establish a defendant's base offense level, 
and its last sentence would result in a reduction to the base 
offense level, as a mitigating factor, in certain circumstances.  
If this interpretation were adopted, the defendant would properly 
bear the burden of proving entitlement to a reduction in offense 
level under McDowell, where we explained that: 
 [T]he burden of ultimate persuasion should 
rest upon the party attempting to adjust the 
sentence.  Thus, when the Government attempts 
to upwardly adjust the sentence, it must bear 
the burden of persuasion.  This prevents the 
criminal defendant from having to "prove the 
negative" in order to avoid a stiffer 
sentence.  . . .  Conversely, when the 
defendant is attempting to justify a downward 
departure, it is usually the defendant who 
bears the burden of persuasion. 
McDowell, 888 F.2d at 291 (citation omitted). 
 However, it is more reasonable to read Note 12, in its 
entirety, as addressing how a defendant's base offense level may 
be determined in the first instance when a drug transaction 
remains unconsummated, for it is important to bear in mind that 
calculating the amount of drugs involved in criminal activity 
neither aggravates nor mitigates a defendant's sentence; rather, 
it provides the starting point (a "base offense level," in 
 
 
Guidelines terminology) from which a district court can proceed 
to make adjustments for factors that do, indeed, aggravate or 
mitigate the sentence.  Thus, given that the government bears the 
burden of establishing the amount of drugs for which a defendant 
should be held accountable, the government should likewise be 
required to prove a defendant's intent or capability to produce a 
negotiated amount of drugs if those issues are called into 
question by the defendant. 
 In reaching this conclusion, we reject the suggestion 
offered by the government at oral argument that the burden of 
persuasion related to the last sentence of Note 12 is best placed 
on the defendant because evidence and information about his or 
her intent and capability is uniquely in the defendant's hands.  
Reasoning such as this has often been the basis for assigning 
burdens of proof to various parties in civil cases.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Continental Ins. Co., 776 F.2d 962, 964 (11th 
Cir. 1985).9  But in a case such as this, involving a courier 
defendant, the government's reasoning simply does not support 
imposing the burden of proof on a defendant.  While we can 
conceive of a seller or buyer defendant having sole possession of 
and access to information about his or her intent and ability to 
sell or purchase a certain amount of drugs, the proposition may 
                     
9.   We note, however, as one commentator has observed, that the 
practice of assigning burdens of proof on particular matters to 
those who have greater access to the facts in issue "should not 
be overemphasized.  Very often one must plead and prove matters 
as to which [one's] adversary has superior access to the proof."  
2 McCormick on Evidence § 337 at 429 (4th ed. 1992).   
 
 
be rendered less likely when a defendant has been convicted of 
transporting (or, in this case, agreeing to transport) drugs for 
others.  In the latter category of cases, the government may be 
just as able to prove intent and capability as the defendant is 
able to prove their absence.  And although the government's 
reasoning has some force in cases involving buyer or seller 
defendants, we do not believe it overcomes the fundamental 
principle that the government bears the ultimate burden to 
establish the amount of drugs under negotiation.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the government should be assigned the burden of 
establishing not only the negotiated amount of drugs, but also 
the defendant's intent or reasonable capability to produce them 




 Having established where the burdens of persuasion and 
production lie in cases implicating the final sentence of Note 
12, as well as the nature of those burdens, we now turn to 
Raven's claim of substantive error by the district court in 
applying Note 12.  Raven's argument is essentially driven by the 
dictionary.  Citing the American Heritage College Dictionary as 
authority for the proposition that the term "produce" means "to 
bring forth, create, or manufacture," Raven claims that Hilton's 
testimony at the sentencing hearing established that Raven 
neither intended to "produce" nor was reasonably capable of 
"producing" either heroin or money to pay for it.  Appellant's 
Reply Br. at 10-11.  Raven notes that Hilton's testimony 
established that Raven was neither a buyer nor a seller of heroin 
and that he could provide no financing for the scheme.  App. at 
58, 63, 68.  This evidence, according to Raven, proves that he 
could not "produce" any heroin or any money to pay for the 
drugs.10 
                     
10.   Raven also argues that Hilton's testimony proved that there 
was never any heroin to "produce" because Raven was the object of 
a DEA "sting" in which there never really was any heroin at all.  
App. at 61-62.  But the fact that no drugs were really on their 
way into the United States as a result of Raven's conspiracy is 
simply a happy -- and all too infrequent -- curiosity of this 
case.  That fact does not decrease the reprehensibility of 
Raven's crime:  drugs cannot travel from faraway lands to our 
cities and neighborhoods without people who are ready, willing, 
and able to carry them.  Nor does the fact that no drugs were 
ultimately involved in the conspiracy permit a court to ignore 
the actual amount of heroin -- three to four kilograms -- that 
Raven thought he was going to transport, intended to transport, 
and was capable of transporting. 
 
 
 In making this argument, however, Raven assigns too 
literal a meaning to the term "produce" and thus unreasonably 
constrains Note 12.  We believe that the salutary last sentence 
of Note 12 must have some content in the world of courier 
sentencing, in order to force the government to demonstrate a 
courier's level of culpability when a drug transaction remains 
unconsummated and the courier's intent and ability to consummate 
the transaction are put in issue.11  However, we agree with the 
government that to apply the principle embodied in Note 12, the 
focus must shift according to a defendant's role in the offense.  
Other courts addressing the language of Note 12 have not 
hesitated to interpret that language according to context.  For 
example, the Fourth Circuit found that the language in question 
applied to a purchaser, because the note "speaks of `traffic in a 
controlled substance,' . . . a term sufficiently broad to 
encompass the purchase and sale of controlled substances."  
Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1151.  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit, 
confronted with a case in which the defendants were to procure 
and then sell an amount of drugs to an undercover agent, 
concluded that "[i]n this context, to `produce' means to obtain 
or deliver, as well as to manufacture."  Tillman, 8 F.3d at 19. 
                     
11.   Thus, we reject the plausible (but unsatisfying) argument, 
advanced by the government before the district court, that the 
last sentence of Note 12 applies only to drug sellers.  App. 
at 39.  The government does not press this argument before us, 
and it seems to us fundamentally unfair that only in cases 
involving unconsummated drug transactions by sellers would the 
government have to demonstrate that the defendant intended and 
was able to complete the negotiated transaction.  We do not 
believe that the Sentencing Commission intended such a result. 
 
 
 Because of the variety of schemes that may be employed 
to traffic in narcotics, there are a multitude of situations in 
which a person's participation may result in the ultimate aim of 
a drug deal, which is to put drugs into someone else's hands in 
exchange for money.  It seems obvious, then, that the word 
"produce" must vary according to context.  "Produce" in the sense 
described in Tillman would apply where a defendant is a seller of 
drugs.  When the defendant is a drug buyer, Note 12 would address 
the quantity of drugs that the defendant intended to purchase and 
was reasonably capable of purchasing.  Brooks, supra.  And where, 
as in this case, a defendant has been convicted of conspiring to 
transport drugs, the proper focus is the quantity of drugs the 
defendant intended to transport and was reasonably capable of 
transporting. 
 Thus, Raven's contention that he had neither money nor 
drugs is irrelevant in a courier case.  The wrong being punished 
is the conspiracy to import drugs into the United States, and the 
issue for determination in the district court was what amount of 






 Raven contends that if we conclude that the issue to be 
resolved under the last sentence of Note 12 is whether he had the 
intent and capability to transport a negotiated amount of heroin, 
we should remand to the district court for a determination of 
that issue and for resentencing.  Other circuits which have 
addressed the language in the final sentence of Note 12 have 
concluded that a district court must make explicit findings as to 
intent and capability.  United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 
1263 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Jacobo, 934 F.2d 
411, 416 (2d Cir. 1991).  We agree:  it is necessary that 
district courts develop an adequate record for review when intent 
and capability are put in issue by the defendant.  Although the 
district court did not anticipate our ruling and focus on whether 
Raven intended to transport and was reasonably capable of 
transporting the negotiated amount of heroin here, and did not 
make explicit findings in that regard, that is hardly surprising, 
for prescience is a tall order to fill.12  We emphasize, though, 
that it is for the district court in the first instance to make 
these findings, and while in this case that may be a rather 
academic exercise,13 we decline to usurp the district court's 
                     
12.   Although the district court's ruling is not without 
ambiguity, it is clear that the court was not only aware of 
Raven's argument that Note 12 required a lower base offense 
level, but that it took testimony on the issue and considered 
Note 12 in determining that Raven should be held responsible for 
three to four kilograms of heroin.  See App. at 88-96. 
13.   There appears to be ample evidence of Raven's intent and 
capacity to transport at least three to four kilograms of heroin.  
Concerning intent, as the district court found, "three to four 
[kilograms of heroin] was the opening salvo and one which was 
never rejected or debated."  App. at 94.  Furthermore, Raven 
 
 
role and will instead remand for resentencing consistent with 
this opinion. 
 B. 
 In his second challenge to his sentence, Raven argues 
that because the government single-handedly determined the amount 
of drugs involved in the conspiracy, the district court should 
have departed downward from the otherwise applicable base level.  
(..continued) 
concedes in his brief that "he demonstrated his willingness to 
participate in the plan to import heroin and that he recruited 
another for this purpose . . . ."  Appellant's Br. at 17-18.  
There was also unrefuted testimony that both Raven and Ramirez 
knew that they were going to transport the heroin in suitcases 
and that three to four kilograms of heroin could be transported 
in a single suitcase.  See App. at 61, 51.  And Raven tacitly 
agreed that the trip would not be worthwhile unless at least 
three or four kilograms of heroin were brought back to the United 
States.  App. at 50. 
 
 As for capability, there is no need in this case to inquire 
into whether Raven had a source that could supply three to four 
kilograms of heroin, as there might be in a case in which the 
defendant was proposing to sell heroin to an undercover agent.  
Nor is there a need to inquire into whether Raven had a source of 
funding sufficiently large to purchase three to four kilograms of 
heroin, as there might be in a case in which a defendant was 
proposing to purchase heroin from an undercover agent.  In a case 
such as this, in which a defendant acts as a mere courier 
transporting drugs from overseas, there would appear to be 
nothing more to the "reasonable capability" inquiry than 
determining whether the defendant had a passport, could travel to 
the assigned destination, could pick up and carry suitcases, and 
could return.  Evidence presented at the sentencing hearing 
suggested that Raven was an experienced drug courier who had made 
runs to Thailand before.  Furthermore, the record showed that 
Raven's discussions with Taju and Hilton at all times 
contemplated at least one suitcase being used for transport, and, 
again, testimony indicated that one suitcase could hold three to 
four kilograms of heroin.  Additionally, the evidence established 
that Raven had recruited Ramirez to participate in the 
transportation, from which one might infer that the conspirators 
could transport at least one suitcase of heroin. 
 
 
The government's behavior, Raven contends, constituted 
"sentencing entrapment," which has been defined as "`outrageous 
official conduct [which] overcomes the will of an individual 
predisposed only to dealing in small quantities' for the purpose 
of increasing the amount of drugs . . . and the resulting 
sentence of the entrapped defendant."  United States v. Rogers, 
982 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1993), quoting United States v. 
Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir. 1991).  Raven argues that 
the district court committed legal error in refusing to depart 
downward on this basis or, alternatively, that it failed to 
depart because it believed it lacked authority to do so.  Our 
review of both contentions is plenary.  See United States v. 
Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 160 n.2 (3d Cir. 1992) (failure to 
depart because of mistake of law); United States v. Love, 985 
F.2d 732, 734 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993) (failure to depart because of 
uncertainty about authority to depart). 
 Contrary to Raven's argument that the district court 
may have believed that it did not have authority to depart 
downward because of entrapment by the government, the court in 
fact reached the issue.  Specifically, the court determined that 
the government's behavior did not amount to sentence entrapment, 
making departure on that ground inappropriate.  App. at 88-91.  
We have not as yet had occasion to address the theory of 
sentencing entrapment described in Rogers and Lenfesty, and we do 
not do so today, but we agree with the district court that Raven 
is not a candidate for departure based on that ground even 
assuming that the doctrine has vitality in this circuit.  Hilton 
 
 
testified -- and Raven did not dispute -- that the government 
suggested that the conspirators import three to four kilograms of 
heroin, instead of some smaller amount, because in Hilton's 
experience it was not feasible for suppliers in Thailand or 
conspirators in the United States to "set up such a trip and 
bring back just one or two kilograms of heroin."  App. at 50.14  
And far from being entrapped, Raven was an experienced drug 
courier who demonstrated what can only be characterized as a 
yeoman's attitude towards this venture.  Hilton testified that 
when Raven was told that it would be necessary to import at least 
three to four kilograms of heroin in order to make the venture 
feasible, Raven responded that "whatever we had to bring back, 
there was no problem.  He was ready to bring it back.  He wanted 
this to be an ongoing thing.  He wanted to prove his loyalty and 
his trust.  He would bring back whatever was over there."  App. 
at 51.  Clearly, the district court did not err in refusing to 
depart downward for entrapment. 
 C. 
 Finally, Raven contends that the district court erred 
in finding that he was predisposed to import three to four 
kilograms of heroin.  Since we have found that there was no 
entrapment in this case, we need not reach the issue of 
                     
14.   While it is true that the government later increased (from 
four kilograms to eight and then twelve) the amount of heroin 
that Raven was to have transported (App. at 54-55, 56-57), we 
need not address whether this behavior constituted an instance of 
impermissible "ratcheting" because the district court found Raven 
responsible for only three to four kilograms. 
 
 
predisposition.  In any event, reviewing for clear error, see 
United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 964 (3d Cir. 1992), we 
note that the record indicates that Raven initiated the contact 
that led to the importation scheme, and when Taju and Hilton 
provided him the opportunity to participate, Raven not only 
immediately took it, but continued to demonstrate his 
enthusiastic support for the scheme until his arrest.  We find 
that the district court did not err here, either. 
 III. 
 In conclusion, we do not gainsay that there is often 
something potentially troubling about an indictment that charges 
that a defendant conspired to traffic in narcotics, where the 
pleaded facts show that:  (1) the defendant had no means (money 
or contacts) to produce or sell any narcotics, and no means 
(money or credit) to buy narcotics; (2) the narcotics transaction 
in which he was supposed to be a courier never got off the 
ground; and (3) the deal was negotiated with a government 
informant and the co-conspirator was only another courier 
(recruited by the defendant).  There is, in these circumstances, 
no physical evidence of the crime, and not only conviction but 
also sentence will turn entirely upon the credibility of the 
government (and defense) witnesses.  However, the facts described 
in footnote 13 supra appear to be sufficiently concrete that 
there is no cause for such concern here.  Of course, we intimate 
no view as to what the district court should do on remand. 
 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will remand for 
resentencing as discussed in section II.A.3, and will affirm in 
all other respects. 
